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Abstract The Internet-of-Things (IoT) generates vast quantities of data, much of it
attributable to individuals’ activity and behaviour. Gathering personal data and per-
formingmachine learning tasks on this data in a central location presents a significant
privacy risk to individuals as well as challenges with communicating this data to the
cloud. However, analytics based on machine learning and in particular deep learning
benefit greatly from large amounts of data to develop high-performance predictive
models. This work reviews federated learning as an approach for performingmachine
learning on distributed data with the goal of protecting the privacy of user-generated
data as well as reducing communication costs associated with data transfer. We
survey a wide variety of papers covering communication-efficiency, client hetero-
geneity and privacy preserving methods that are crucial for federated learning in the
context of the IoT. Throughout this review, we identify the strengths and weaknesses
of different methods applied to federated learning and finally, we outline future di-
rections for privacy preserving federated learning research, particularly focusing on
IoT applications.
1 Introduction
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is represented by network-connected machines, often
small embedded computers that provide physical objects with digital capabilities
such as identification, inventory tracking and sensing & actuator control. Mobile
devices such as smartphones also represent a facet of the IoT, often used as a sensing
Christopher Briggs
Keele University, Staffordshire, UK, e-mail: c.briggs@keele.ac.uk
Zhong Fan
Keele University, Staffordshire, UK e-mail: z.fan@keele.ac.uk
Peter Andras
Keele University, Staffordshire, UK e-mail: p.andras@keele.ac.uk
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
11
79
4v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  8
 Se
p 2
02
0
2 Christopher Briggs, Zhong Fan and Peter Andras
device as well as to control and monitor other IoT devices. The applications that
drive analytical insights in the IoT are often powered by machine learning and deep
learning.
Gartner [1] predicts that 25 billion IoT devices will be in use by 2021, forecasting
a bright future for IoT applications. However this poses a challenge for traditional
cloud-based IoT computing. The volume, velocity and variety of data streaming from
billions of these devices requires vast amounts of bandwidth which can become
extremely cost prohibitive. Additionally, many IoT applications require very low-
latency or near real-time analytics and decision making capabilities. The round-trip
delay from devices to the cloud and back again is unacceptable for such applications.
Finally, transmitting sensitive data collected by IoTdevices to the cloud poses security
and privacy concerns. Edge computing, and more recently, fog computing [2] have
been proposed as a solution to these problems.
Edge computing (and its variants: mobile edge computing, multi-access edge
computing) restrict analytics processing to the edge of the network âĂŞ on devices
attached to, or very close to the perception layer [3]. However storage and compute
power may be severely limited and coordination between multiple devices may be
non-existent in the edge computing paradigm. Fog computing [2] offers an alternative
to cloud computing or edge computing alone formany analytics tasks but significantly
increases the complexity of an IoT network. Fog computing is generally described as
a continuum of compute, storage and networking capabilities to power applications
and services in one or more tiers that bridge the gap between the cloud and the
edge [4, 5]. Fog computing enables highly scalable, low-latency, geo-distributed
applications, supporting location awareness and mobility [6]. Despite rising interest
in fog-based computing, much research is still focused on deployment of analytics
applications (including deep learning applications) directly to edge devices.
Performing computationally expensive tasks such as training deep learning mod-
els on edge devices poses a challenge due to limited energy budgets and compute
capabilities [7]. In cloud environments, massively powerful and scalable servers
making use of parallelisation are typically employed for deep learning tasks [8].
In edge computing environments, alternative methods for distributing training are
required. Additionally, as limited bandwidth is a key constraint in computing near/at
the edge, the challenge of reducing network data transfer is also important. Federated
learning [9] has been proposed as a method for distributed machine learning, suitable
for edge computing environments addresses many of the issues discussed above -
namely, compute power, data transfer as well as privacy preservation.
This review provides a comprehensive survey of privacy preserving federated
learning. We show how federated learning is ideally suited for data analytics in the
IoT and review research addressing privacy concerns [10], bandwidth limitations
[11], and power/compute limitations [12]. The rest of this review is organised as
follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to preliminary work on distributed ma-
chine learning and its influence on federated learning literature. Section 3 describes
federated learning in detail and outlines the major contributions to federated learning
research including methods for reducing communication. Following this, section 4
gives an overview of privacy in data analysis and methods for preserving the privacy
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of an individual’s data. Section 5 follows with an analysis of privacy preserving
methods as applied to federated learning to protect latent data. Finally section 6 dis-
cusses major outstanding challenges and future directions to apply federated learning
to IoT applications and section 7 presents concluding remarks.
2 Distributed machine learning
Federated learning was preceded by much work in distributed machine learning
in the data-centre [13, 8, 14]. This section gives a brief history of distributed ma-
chine learning, paying particular attention to distributed deep learning training via
stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Deep learning is concerned with machine learn-
ing problems based on artificial neural networks comprised of many layers and has
been used with great success in the fields of computer vision, speech recognition
and translation as well as many other areas [15]. In these fields, most other machine
learning methods have been surpassed by deep learning methods due to the very
complex functions they can compute which can both approximate training labels
and generalise well to unseen samples.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are composed of multiple connected units (also
known as neurons) organised into layers through which the training data flows [16].
Each unit computes a weighted sum of its input values (including a bias term)
composed with a non-linear activation function g(W>X + b) and returns the result
to the next connected layer. Passing data through the network and performing a
prediction is known as the forward pass. To train the network, a backward pass
operation is specified to compute updates to the weights and biases in order to better
approximate the labels associated with the training data. An algorithm known as
backpropagation [17] is used to propagate the error back through each layer of the
network by calculating gradients of the weights and biases with respect to the error.
DNNs perform best when trained on very large datasets and often incorporate
millions if not billions of parameters to expressweights between neurons (for example
the AlexNet DNN achieved state-of-the-art performance on the ImageNet dataset in
2012 using 60 million parameters [18]). Both of these factors require large sums of
memory and compute capabilities. To scale complex DNNs trained on lots of data
requires concurrency across multiple CPUs or more commonly GPUs (most often
in a local cluster). GPUs are optimised to perform matrix calculations and are well
suited for the operations required to compute activations across a DNN. Concurrency
can be achieved in a variety of ways as discussed below.
2.1 Concurrency
To train a large DNN efficiently across multiple nodes, the calculations required in
the forward and backward passes need to parellelised. One method to achieve this
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is model parallelism which distributes collections of neurons among the available
compute nodes [13]. Each node then only needs to compute the activations of
its own neurons, however must communicate regularly with nodes computing on
connected neurons. The calculations on all nodes must occur synchronously and
therefore computation proceeds at the speed of the slowest node in the cluster.
Another drawback of the model parallelism approach is that the current mini-batch
must be copied to all nodes in the compute cluster, further increasing communication
costs within the cluster.
A secondmethod resolves some of the issues of excessive communication between
nodes by distributing one or more layers on each node. This ensures that that each
worker node only needs to communicate with the one other node (a different node
depending whether the computation is part of the forward pass or the backward pass)
[8]. However, this method still requires that data in the mini-batch be copied to all
nodes in the cluster.
The final method to achieve parallelism in training a large DNN is termed data
parallelism. This method partitions the training dataset and copies the subsets to
each compute node in the cluster. Each node computes forward and backward passes
over the same model but using mini-batches drawn from its own subset of the
training data. The results of the weight updates are then reduced on each iteration
via MapReduce or more commonly today, via message passing interface (MPI) [8].
Data parallelism is particularly effective as most operations over mini-batches in
SGD are independent. Therefore scaling the problem via sharding the data to many
nodes is relatively simple compared to the methods mentioned above. This method
solves the issue of training with large amounts of data but requires that the model
(and its parameters) fit in memory on each node.
Hybrid parallelism combines two or all three of the concurrency schemes men-
tioned above to mitigate the drawbacks associated with each and best support paral-
lelism on the underlying hardware. DistBelief [13] achieves this by distributing the
data, network layers, and neurons within the same layer among the available compute
nodes, making use of all three concurrency schemes. Similarly, Project Adam [19]
employs all three concurrency schemes but much more efficiently than DistBelief
(using significantly fewer nodes to achieve high accuracy on the ImageNet1 22k data
set)
2.2 Model consistency
Model consistency refers to the state of a model when trained in a distributed manner
[8] - a consistent model should reflect the same parameter values among compute
nodes prior to each training iteration (or set of training iterations, sometimes referred
to as a communication round). In order to maintain model consistency, individual
compute nodes need towrite updates to a global parameter server [14]. The parameter
1 http://www.image-net.org/
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server performs some form of aggregation on the updates to synchronise a global
model and the parameters (for example, weights in a neural network) are then shared
with the individual compute nodes for the next iteration/round of training.
There are several broad methods by which to train, update and share a distributed
deep learning model. Synchronous updates occur when the parameter server waits
for all compute nodes to return parameters for aggregation. This method provides
high consistency between iterations/rounds of training as each node always receives
up-to-date parameters but is not hardware performant due to delays caused by the
slowest communicating node. For example, a set of parameters wt at time t is shared
among nc compute nodes. The compute nodes each perform some number of forward
and backward passes over the data available to them and compute the parameter
gradients ∆wc . These gradients are communicated to the parameter server, which
in turn averages the gradients from all workers and then updates the parameters for
time t + 1:
∆wt =
1
nc
nc∑
c=1
∆wc .
wt+1 = wt − η∆wt .
(1)
Asynchronous updates occur when the parameter server shares the latest param-
eters without waiting for all nodes to return parameter updates. This reduces model
consistency as parameters can be overwritten and become stale due to slow commu-
nicating nodes. This method is hardware performant however as optimisation can
proceed without waiting for all nodes to send parameter updates. The HOGWILD!
algorithm [20] takes advantage of sparsity within the parameter update matrix to
asynchronously update gradients in shared memory resulting in faster convergence.
Downpour SGD [13] describes asynchronous updates as an additional mechanism
to add stochasticity to the optimisation process resulting in greater prediction per-
formance.
In order to improve consistency using hardware performant asynchronous up-
dates, the concept of parameter ‘staleness’ has been tackled by several works. The
stale synchronous parallel (SSP) model [21] synchronises the global model once a
maximum staleness threshold has been reached but still allows workers to compute
updates on stale values between global model syncs. The impact of staleness in
asynchronous SGD can also be mitigated by adapting the learning rate as a function
of the parameter staleness [22, 23]. As an example a worker pushes an update at
t = j to the parameter server at t = i. The parameters in the global model at t = i are
the most up-to-date available. To prevent a stale parameter update from occurring, a
staleness parameter τk for the k-th parameter is calculated as τk = i− j. The learning
rate used in Equation 1 is modified as:
ηk =
{
η/τk if τk , 0
η otherwise
. (2)
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2.3 Centralised vs decentralised learning
Centralised distribution of the model updates requires a parameter server (which
may be a single machine or sharded across multiple machines as in [13]). The global
model tracks the averaged parameters aggregated from all the compute nodes that
perform training (see Equation 1). The downside to this distribution method is the
high communication cost between compute nodes and the parameter server. Multiple
shards can relieve this bottleneck to some extent, such that different workers read
and write parameter updates to specific shards [19, 13].
Heterogeneity of worker resources is handled well in centralised distribution
models. Distributed compute nodes introduce varying amounts of latency (espe-
cially when distributed geographically as in [24]), yet training can proceed via
asynchronous, or more efficiently, stale-synchronous methods [25]. Heterogeneity is
an inherent feature of federated learning.
Decentralised distribution of DNN training does not rely on a parameter server
to aggregate updates from workers but instead allows workers to communicate with
one another, resulting in each worker performing aggregation on data from the
parameters it receives. Gossip algorithms that share updates between a fixed number
of neighbouring nodes have been applied to distributed SGD [26, 27, 28] in order
to efficiently communicate/aggregate updates between all nodes in an exponential
fashion similar to how disease is spread during an epidemic.
Communication can be avoided completely during training, resulting in many
individual models represented by very different parameters. These models can be
combined (as an ensemble [15]), however averaging the predictions from many
models can slow down inference on new data. To tackle this, a process known as
knowledge distillation can be used to train a single DNN (known as the mimic
network) to emulate the predictions of an ensemble model [29, 30, 31]. Unlabelled
data is passed through the ensemble network to obtain labels on which the mimic
network can be trained.
3 Federated learning
3.1 Overview
Federated learning extends the idea of distributed machine learning, making use of
data parallelism. However, rather than randomly partitioning a centralised dataset to
many compute nodes, training occurs in the user domain on distributed data owned
by the individual users (often referred to as clients) [9]. The consequence of this is
that user data is never shared directly with a third party orchestrating the training
procedure. This greatly benefits users where the data might be considered sensitive.
Where data needs to be observed (for example, during the training operation), pro-
cessing is handled on the device where the data resides (for example a smartphone).
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Once a round of training is completed on the device, the model parameters are
communicated to an aggregating server, such as a parameter server provided by a
third party. Although the training data itself is never disclosed to the third-party, it
is a reasonable concern that something about an individual’s training data might be
inferred by the parameter updates; this is discussed further in section 5.
Federated learning is vastly more distributed than traditional approaches for train-
ing machine learning models via data parallelism. Some of the key differences are
[9]:
1. Many contributing clients - federated learning needs to be scalable to many
millions of clients.
2. Varying quantity of data owned by each user - some clients may train on only
a few samples; others may have thousands.
3. Often very different data distributions between users - user data is highly
personal to individuals and therefore the model trained by each client represents
non-IID (independent, identically distributed) data.
4. High latency between clients and aggregating service - updates are commonly
communicated via the internet introducing significant latency between commu-
nication rounds.
5. Unstable communication between clients and aggregating service - client
devices are likely to become unavailable during training due to their mobility,
battery life, or other reasons.
These distinguishing features of federated learning pose challenges above and
beyond standard distributed learning.
Although this review focuses on deep learning in particular, many other ML
algorithms can be trained via federated learning. Any ML algorithm designed to
minimise an objective function of the form:
min
w∈Rd
1
m
m∑
i=1
fi(w). (3)
is well suited to training via many clients (for example linear regression and
logistic regression). Some non-gradient based algorithms can also be trained in this
way, such as principal component analysis and k-mean clustering [32].
Federated optimisation was first suggested as a new setting for vastly and unevenly
distributedmachine learning byKonec˘ný et al. [33] in 2016. In their work, the authors
first describe the nature of the federated setting (non-IID data, varying quantity of
data per client etc). Additionally, the authors test a simple application of distributed
gradient descent against a federated modification of SVRG (a variance reducing
variant of SGD [34]) over distributed data. Federated SVRG calculates gradients
and performs parameter updates on each of K nodes over the available data on
each node and obtains a weighted average of the parameters from all clients. The
performance of these algorithms are verified on a logistic regression language model
usingGoogle+ data to determinewhether a post will receive at least one comment. As
logistic regression is a convex problem, the algorithms can be benchmarked against
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a known optimum. Federated SVRG is shown to outperform gradient descent by
converging to the optimum within 30 rounds of communication.
Algorithm 1 Federated Averaging (FedAvg) algorithm. C is the fraction of clients
selected to participate in each communication round. The K clients are indexed by k;
B is the local mini-batch size, Pk is the dataset available to client k, E is the number
of local epochs, and η is the learning rate
1: procedure FedAvg . Run on server
2: Initialise w0
3: for each round t = 1, 2, ... do
4: m← max (C · K, 1)
5: St ← (random set of m clients)
6: for each client k ∈ St do . In parallel
7: wk
t+1 ← ClientUpdate(k, wt )
8: end for
9: wt+1 ← ∑Kk=1 nkn wkt+1
10: end for
11: end procedure
12: procedure ClientUpdate(k, w) . Run on client k
13: B ← (Split Pk into mini-batches of size B)
14: for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
15: for batch b ∈ B do
16: w ← w − η∇L(w; b)
17: end for
18: end for
19: return w to server
20: end procedure
Federated learning (as described in [9] simplifies the federated SVRG approach
in [33] by modifying SGD for the federated setting. McMahan et al. [9] provide two
distributed SGD scenarios for their experiments: FedSGD and FedAvg. FedSGD
performs a single step of gradient descent on all the clients and averages the gradients
on the server. The FedAvg algorithm (shown in algorithm 1) randomly selects a
fraction of the clients to participate in each round of training. Each client k computes
the gradients on the current state of the global model wt and updates the parameters
wk
t+1 in the standard fashion in gradient descent:
∀k,wkt+1 ← wt − η∇ f (wt ). (4)
All clients communicate their updates to the aggregating server, which then
calculates a weighted average of the contributions from each client to update the
global model:
wt+1 ←
K∑
k=1
nk
n
wkt+1. (5)
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Here, nk/n is the fraction of data available to the client compared to the available
data to all participating clients. Clients can perform one or multiple steps of gradient
descent before sending weight updates as orchestrated by the federated algorithm.
A diagram describing how federated learning proceeds in the FedAvg scenario is
provided in Figure 1
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram showing how communication proceeds between the aggregating server
and individual clients according to the FedAvg protocol. This procedure is iterated until the model
converges or the model reaches some desired target metric (e.g. elapsed time, accuracy)
Centralised machine learning (and distributed learning in the data center) benefits
from training under the assumption that data can be shuffled and is independent
and identically distributed (IID). This assumption is generally invalid in federated
learning as the training data is decentralised with significantly different distributions
and number of samples between participating clients. Training using non-IID data
has been shown to converge much more slowly than IID data in a federated learning
setting using the MNIST2 dataset (for handwritten digit recognition), distributed
between clients after having been sorted by the target label [9]. The overall accuracy
achieved by a DNN trained via federated learning can be significantly reduced when
trained on highly skewed non-IID data [35]. Yue et al. [35] show that accuracy can
be improved by sharing a small subset of non-private data between all the clients
in order to reduce the variance between weight updates of the clients involved in
each communication round. The FedProx algorithm [36] encompasses FedAvg as a
special case and adds a regularising term to the local optimisation objective. This
has the effect of limiting the distance between the local model and global model
during each communication round and stabilises training overall. Karimireddy et al
[37] takes a similar approach using SCAFFOLD by accounting for client drift (the
estimated difference between the global and local model directions) and corrects
for this in the model update step. This can be understood as a variance reduction
2 http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
10 Christopher Briggs, Zhong Fan and Peter Andras
method and significantly outperforms FedAvg by reducing the number of rounds of
communication and improving the final model accuracy on highly skewed non-IID
data.
Table 1 A summary of important contributions to federated learning research
Ref Research focus Year Major contribution
[33] Optimisation 2016 First description of federated optimisation and its application to
a convex problem (logistic regression)
[9] Optimisation 2016 Description of federated averaging (FedAvg) algorithm to im-
prove the performance of the global model and reduce commu-
nication between the clients and server
[38] Communication 2016 Methods for compressing weight updates and reducing the band-
width required to perform federated learning
[39] Multi-task FL 2017 Application of multi-task learning in a federated setting and dis-
cussion of system challenges relevant to using federated learning
on resource-constrained devices
[40] FL attacks 2018 A demonstration of poisoning the shared global model in a fed-
erated learning setting
[41] FL attacks 2018 A method to recognise adversarial clients and combat model
poisoning in a federated learning setting
[42] Application 2018 Application of federated learning in a commercial setting (next
word keyborard prediction in Android Gboard)
[43] Optimisation 2018 Application of per-coordinate averaging (based on Adam) to fed-
erated learning to achieve faster convergence (in fewer commu-
nication rounds)
[44] Application 2018 Applied federated learning to a healthcare application including
further training after federated learning on client data (transfer
learning)
[45] Client selection 2018 Amethod of federated learning selecting clients with faster com-
munication/greater resources to participate in each communica-
tion round achieving faster convergence
[12] Communication 2018 Description of adaptive federated learning method suitable for
deployment on resource-constrained devices to optimally learn a
shared model while maintaining a fixed energy budget
[35] Non-IID 2018 Characterisation of how non-IID data reduces the model perfor-
mance of federated learning and method for improving model
performance
[36] Optimisation 2018 Adds a tunable regularising term to FedAvg to stabilise training
on skewed, non-IID data, limiting the influence of client models
on the global model.
[46] Multi-task FL 2019 Training pluralistic models that are tailored to subsets of clients
that belong to the same timezones
[37] Optimisation 2020 Applies a variance reduction method for improving convergence
speed on non-IID data compared to FedAvg
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3.2 Multi-task federated learning
Adifferent approach to federating optimisation overmany nodes is proposed bySmith
et al. [39]. In this work, each client’s data distribution is modelled as a single task as
part of a multi-task learning objective. In multi-task learning, all tasks are assumed
to be similar and therefore each task can benefit from learning derived from all the
other tasks. On three different problems (based on human activity recognition and
computer vision), the federated multi-task learning setting outperforms a centralised
global setting and a strictly localised setting with lower average prediction errors.
As part of this work [39], the authors also show that federated multi-task learning is
robust to nodes temporarily dropping out during learning and when communication
is reduced (by simulating more iterations on the client per communication round).
Eichner et al. [46] propose a pluralistic approach to tackle the issue of training
only when devices are available (generally overnight for mobile phones). Multiple
models are trained according to the timezone when the device is available and results
in better language models targeted at each timezone. To specifically tackle the issue
to model degredation due to the presence of non-IID data [35], Sattler et al. [47]
propose splitting the shared model by determining the cosine similarity of updates
from different clients during training. Similarly, Briggs et al. [48] use a hierarchical
clustering algorithm to judge client update similarity to produce models tailored to
clients with similarly-distributed data.
3.3 Applied federated learning
Federated learning is particularly well suited as a solution for distributed learning
in the IoT setting. As such, federated learning research is flourishing in various ap-
plications associated with the IoT. Federated learning has been applied in robotics
to aid multiple robots to share imitation learning strategies [49] and more gener-
ally for protecting privacy-sensitive robotics tasks [50]. In mobile edge computing
environments, federated learning has been demonstrated for predicting demand in
edge deployed applications [51] and for improving proactive edge content caching
mechanisms [52]. For vehicular edge computing, Lu et al. [53] propose a framework
to tackle issues of intermittent vehicle connectivity and an untrusted aggregating
entity and Ye et al. [54] propose a system using federated learning for intelligent
connected vehicle image classification tasks. Energy demand in electrical vehicle
charging networks has also been addressed with a federated learning strategy by
Saputra et al. [55]. For anomaly detection in IoT environments, federated learning
has been applied to detect intrusions and attacks by Nguyen et al. [56]. More novel
applications of federated learning include learning to detect jamming in drone net-
works [57], predicting breaks in presence by users of virtual reality environments
[58] and human activity recognition using wearable devices [59].
For supervised problems, user data needs to be labelled by the user to be useful
for training. This is demonstrated in [42] where a long short-term memory neural
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network (LSTM) is trained via many clients on words typed on a mobile keyboard
to predict the next word. However, this data is clearly highly sensitive and should
not be sent to a central server directly and would benefit from training via federated
learning. The training data for this model is automatically labelled when the user
types the next word. In cases where data is stored locally and already labelled such as
medical health records, privacy is of great concern and even sharing of data between
hospitals may be prohibited [60]. Federated learning can be applied in these settings
to improve a shared global model that is more accurate than a model trained by each
hospital separately. In [44], electronic health records from 58 hospitals are used to
train a simple neural network in a federated setting to predict patient mortality. The
authors found that partially training the network using federated learning, followed
by freezing the first layer and training only on the data available to each client resulted
in better performing models for each hospital.
3.4 Federated learning attacks
Due to the nature of distributed client participation required for federated learning,
the protocol is susceptible to adversarial attacks. Multiple works [40, 61] present
methods for poisoning the global model with an adversary acting as a client in the
federated learning setting. The adversary constructs an update such that it survives
the averaging procedure and heavily influences or replaces the global model. In this
way, an adversary can poison the model to return predictions specified by the attacker
given certain input features. Fung et al. [41] describe amethod to defend against sybil-
based adversarial attacks by measuring the similarity between client contributions
during model averaging and filtering attacker’s updates out. These kinds of attacks
might be inadvertently mitigated against using some of the modifications to FedAvg
outlined above (for example by FedProx [36] or SCAFFOLD [37]) to limit the effect
of individual client updates.
3.5 Communication-efficient federated learning
As highlighted above, distributed learning and federated learning in particular suffer
from high latency between communication rounds. Additionally, given a sufficiently
large DNN, the number of parameters that need to be communicated in each com-
munication round from possibly many thousands of clients becomes problematic in
relation to data transmission and traffic arriving at the aggregating server. There are
several approaches to mitigating these issues as discussed in this subsection.
The simplest method to reduce bandwidth use in communicating model updates
is simply to communicate less often. In [9], researchers experimented with the mini-
batch size and number of epochs while training a convolutional neural network
(CNN) on the MNIST dataset as well as an LSTM trained on the complete works of
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WilliamShakespeare3 to predict the next text character after some input of characters.
Using FedAvg, the authors [9] showed that increasing computation on the client
between communication rounds significantly reduced the number of communication
rounds required to converge to a threshold test accuracy compared to a single epoch
trained on all available data on the client (a single iteration of gradient descent). The
greatest reduction in communication rounds was achieved using a mini-batch size of
10 and 20 epochs on the client using theCNNmodel (34.8x) andmini-batch size of 10
and 5 epochs using the LSTM model (95.3x). As this method completely eliminates
many of the communication rounds, it should be preferred over (or combined with)
the compression methods discussed next.
As the network connection used to communicate between the clients and the ag-
gregating server is generally asymmetric (download speed is generally significantly
faster than upload speed), downloading the updated model from the aggregating
server is less of a concern than uploading the updates from the clients. Despite this,
compression methods exist to reduce the size of deep learning models themselves
[62, 63].
The compression of the parameter updates on the client prior to transmission is
important to reduce the size of the overall update but should still maintain a stable
statistical mean when updates from all clients are averaged in the global shared
model. The following compression methods are not specific to federated learning
but have been experimented with in several works related to federated learning.
The individual weights that represent the parameters of a DNN are generally
encoded using a 32-bit floating point number. Multiple works explore the effect
of lossy compression of the weights (or gradients) to 16-bit [64], 8-bit [65], or
even 1-bit [66] employing stochastic rounding to maintain the expected value. The
results of these experiments show that as long as the quantisation error is carried
forward between mini-batch computations, the overall accuracy of the model isn’t
significantly impacted.
Another method to compress the weight matrix itself is to convert the matrix
from a dense representation to a sparse one. This can be achieved by applying a
random mask to the matrix and only communicating the resulting non-zeros values
along with the seed used to generate the random mask [38]. Using this approach
combined with FedAvg on the CIFAR-104 image recognition dataset, it has been
shown [38] that neither the rate of convergence nor the overall test accuracy is
significantly impacted, even when only 6.25% of the weights are transmitted during
each communication round. Also described in [38] is a matrix factorization method
whereby the weight matrix is approximated by the product of a randomly generated
matrix, A and another matrix optimised during training, B. Only the matrix B (plus
the random seed to generate A) needs to be transmitted in each communication
round. The authors show however that this method performs significantly worse than
the random mask method as the compression ratio is increased.
3 https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/100
4 https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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Shokri & Shmatikov [11] propose an alternative sparsification method imple-
mented in their “Selective SGD” (SSGD) procedure. This method transfers only a
fraction of randomly selected weights to each client from the global shared model
and only shares a fraction of updated weights back to the aggregating service. The
updated weights selected to be communicated are determined by either weight size
(largest unsigned magnitude updates) or a random subset of values above a certain
threshold. The authors [11] show that a CNN trained on the MNIST and Street View
House Numbers (SVHN)5 datasets can achieve similar levels of accuracy sharing
only 10% of the updated weights and only a slight drop (1-2%) in accuracy by
sharing only 1% of the updated weights. The paper also shows that the greater the
number of users participating in SSGD, the greater the overall accuracy.
Hardy et al. [67] take a similar approach to selective SGD but select the largest
gradients in each layer rather than the whole weight matrix to better reflect changes
throughout the DNN. Their algorithm, “AdaComp” also uses an adaptive learning
rate per parameter based on the staleness of the parameter to improve overall test
accuracy on the MNIST dataset using a CNN. Most recently, Lin et al. [68] ap-
ply gradient sparsification along with gradient clipping and momentum correction
during training to reduce communication bandwidth by 270x and 600x without a
significant drop in prediction performance on various ML problems in computer
vision, language modelling and speech recognition.
Leroy et al. [43] experiment with using moment-based averaging inspired by the
Adam optimisation procedure, in place of a standard weighted global average in
FedAvg. The authors train a CNN to detect a “wake word” (similar to “Hey Siri”
to initialise the Siri program on iOS devices). The moment-based averaging method
acheives a target recall of almost 95% within 100 rounds of communication over
1400 clients compared to only 30% using global averaging.
By selecting clients based on client resource constraints in a mobile edge com-
puting environment, Nishio & Yonetani [45] show that federated learning can be
sped up considerably. As federated learning proceeds in a synchronous fashion, the
slowest communicating node is a limiting factor in the speed at which training can
progress. In this work [45], target accuracies on the CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST6
datasets are achieved in significantly less time than by using the FedAvg algorithm
in [9]. In a similar vein, Wang et al. [12], aim to take into account client resources
during federated learning training. In this work an algorithm is designed to control
the tradeoff between local gradient updates and global averaging in order to optimally
minimise the loss function under a fixed energy budget - an important problem for
federated learning in the IoT (especially for battery-powered devices).
5 http://ufldl.stanford.edu/housenumbers/
6 https://www.kaggle.com/zalando-research/fashionmnist
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4 Privacy preservation
Data collection for the purpose of learning something about a population (for example
in machine learning to discover a function for mapping the data to target labels) can
expose sensitive information about individual users. In machine learning, this is
often not the primary concern of the developer or researcher creating the model, yet
is extremely important for circumstances where personally sensitive data is collected
and disseminated in some form (e.g. via a trained model). Privacy has become even
more important in the age of big data (data which is characterised by its large volume,
variety and velocity [69]). As businesses gather increasing amounts of data about
users, the risk of privacy breaches via controlled data releases grows.
This review focuses on the protection of an individual’s privacy via controlled
data releases (such as from personal data used to train a machine learning model)
and does not consider privacy breaches via hacking and theft which is a separate
issue related to data security.
Privacy is upheld as a human right in many countries via Article 12 of the
UniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights [70], Article 17 of the International Covenant
on civil and political rights [71], andArticle 8 of the EuropeanConvention onHuman
Rights [72]. In Europe rigorous legislation with respect to data protection via the
General Data Protection Regulation [73] safeguards data privacy such that users are
given the facts about how and what data is collected about them and how it used and
by whom. Despite these rights and regulations, data privacy is difficult to maintain
and breaches of privacy via controlled data releases occur often.
Privacy can be preserved in a number of ways, yet it is important to maintain
a balance between the level of privacy and utility of the data (along with some
consideration for the computational complexity required to preserve privacy). A
privacy mechanism augments the original data in order to prevent a breach of
personal privacy (i.e. an individual should not be able to be recognised in the data).
For example, a privacy mechanism might use noise to augment the result of a query
on the data [74]. Adding too much noise to a result might render it meaningless and
adding too little noisemight leak sensitive information. The privacy/utility tradeoff is
a primary concern of the privacy mechanisms to be discussed in the next subsection.
4.1 Privacy preserving methods
The privacy preserving methods discussed in this section can be described as either
suppressive or perturbative [75]. Suppressive methods include removal of attributes
in the data, restricting queries via the privacymechanism, aggregation/generalisation
of data attributes and returning a sampled version of the original data. Perturbative
methods include noise addition to the result of a query on the data or rounding of
values in the dataset.
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4.1.1 Anonymisation
Anonymisation or de-identification is achieved by removing any information that
might identify an individual within a dataset. Ad-hoc anonymisation might reason-
ably remove names, addresses, phone numbers etc and replace each user’s record(s)
with a pseudonym value to act as an identifier under the assumption that individuals
cannot be identified within the altered dataset. However, this leaves the data open to
privacy attacks known as linkage attacks [75]. In the presence of auxiliary informa-
tion, linkage attacks allow an adversary to re-identify individuals in the otherwise
anonymous dataset.
Several famous examples of such linkage attacks exist. An MIT graduate, La-
tanya Sweeney, purchased voter registration records for the town of Cambridge,
Massachusetts and was able to use combinations of attributes (ZIP code, gender
and date of birth) known as a quasi-identifier to identify the then governor of Mas-
sachusetts, William Weld. When combined with state-released anonymised medical
records, Sweeney was able to identify his medical information from the data release
[76]. As part of a machine learning competition known as the Netflix Prize7 launched
in 2006, Netflix released a random sample of pseudo-anonymised movie rating data.
Narayanan & Shmatikov [77] were able to show that using relatively few publicly
published ratings by IMDb8, all the ratings in the Netflix data for the same user
could be revealed. Lastly, in 2014, celebrities in NewYork were able to be tracked by
combining taxi route data released via freedom of information requests, a de-hashing
of the taxi license numbers (which were based on md5) and with geo-tagged photos
of the celebrities entering/exiting certain taxies [78].
k-anonymity was proposed by Sweeney [79] to tackle the challenge of linkage
attacks on anonymised datasets. Using k-anonymity, data is suppressed such that
k−1 or more individuals possess the same attributes used to create a quasi-identifier.
Therefore, an identifiable record in a auxiliary dataset would link to multiple records
in the anonymous dataset. However k-anonymity cannot defend against linkage
attacks where a sensitive attribute is shared among a group of individuals with
the same quasi-identifier. l-diversity builds on k-anonymity to ensure that there is
diversity within any group of individuals sharing the same quasi-identifier [80].
t-closeness builds on both these methods to preserve the distribution of sensitive
attributes among any group of individuals sharing the same quasi-identifier [81]. All
the methods suffer however when an adversary possesses some knowledge about the
sensitive attribute. Research related to improving k-anonymity based methods has
mostly been abandoned in the literature in preference of methods that offer more
rigorous privacy guarantees (such as differntial privacy)
7 https://www.netflixprize.com/index.html
8 https://www.imdb.com/
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4.1.2 Encryption
Anonymisation presents several difficult challenges in order to provide statistics
about data without disclosing sensitive information. Encrypting data provides better
privacy protection but the ability to perform useful statistical analysis on encrypted
data requires specialist methods. Homomorphic encryption [82] allows for process-
ing of data in its encrypted form. Earlier efforts (termed “Somewhat Homomorphic
Encryption”) allowed for simple addition and multiplication operations on encrypted
data [83], but were shortly followed by Fully Homomorphic Encryption allowing for
any arbitrary function to be applied to data in ciphertext form to yield an encrypted
result [82].
Despite the apparent advantages of homomorphic encryption to provide privacy to
individuals over their data whilst allowing a third party to perform analytics on it, the
computational overhead required to perform such operations is very large [84, 85].
IBM’s homomorphic library implementation9 runs some 50 million times slower
than performing calculations on plaintext data [86]. Due to this computational over-
head, applying homomorphic encryption to training on large-scale machine learning
data is currently impractical [87]. Several projects make use of homomorphic en-
cryption for inference on encrypted private data [88, 84]
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) [89] can also be adopted to compute a
function on private data owned by many parties such that no party learns anything
about others’ data - only the output of the function. Many SMC protocols are based
on Shamir’s secret sharing [90] which splits data into n pieces in such a way that at
least k pieces are required to reconstruct the original data (k−1 pieces reveal nothing
about the original data). For example a value x is shared with multiple servers (as
xA, xB ...) via an SMC protocol such that the data can only be reconstructed if the
shared pieces on k servers are known [91]. Various protocols exist to compute some
function over the data held on the different servers via rounds of communication,
however the servers involved are assumed to be trustworthy.
4.1.3 Differential privacy
Differential privacy provides an elegant and rigorous mathematical measure of the
level of privacy afforded by a privacy preserving mechanism. A differentially private
privacy preserving mechanism acting on very similar datasets will return statistically
indistinguishable results. More formally: Given some privacy mechanism M that
maps inputs from domain D to outputs in range R , it is “almost” equally likely (by
some multiplicative factor ) for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R to occur, regardless of
the presence or absence of a single individual in 2 neighbouring datasets d and d ′
drawn from D (differing by a single individual) [74]
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(d ′) ∈ S]. (6)
9 https://github.com/shaih/HElib
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Here, d and d ′ are interchangeable with the same outcome. This privacy guarantee
protects individuals from being identified within the dataset as the result from the
mechanism should be essentially the same regardless of whether the individual
appeared in the original dataset or not. Differential privacy is an example of a
perturbative privacy preserving method, as the privacy guarantee is achieved by the
addition of noise to the true output. This noise is commonly drawn from a Laplacian
distribution [74] but can also be drawn from a exponential distribution [92] or via the
novel staircase mechanism [93] that provides greater utility compared to laplacian
noise for the same  . The above description of differential privacy is often termed
-differential privacy or strict differential privacy.
The amount of noise required to satisfy -differential privacy is governed by 
and the sensitivity of the statistic function Q defined by [74]:
∆Q = max(| |Q(d) −Q(d ′)| |1). (7)
This maximum is evaluated over all neighbouring datasets in the set D differing
by a single individual. The output of the mechanism using noise drawn from the
Laplacian distribution is then:
M(d) = Q(d) + Laplace (0, ∆Q

)
. (8)
A relaxed version of differential privacy known as ( , δ)-differential privacy [94]
provides greater flexibility in designing privacy preserving mechanisms and greater
resistance to attacks making use of auxiliary information [92]:
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(d ′) ∈ S] + δ. (9)
Whereas -differential privacy provides a privacy guarantee even for results with
extremely small probabilities, the δ in ( , δ)-differential privacy accounts for the
small probability that the privacy guarantee of ordinary -differential privacy is
broken.
The Gaussian mechanism is commonly used to add noise to satisfy ( , δ)-
differential privacy [95], but instead of the L1 norm used in Equation 7, the noise is
scaled to the L2 norm:
∆2Q = max(| |Q(d) −Q(d ′)| |2). (10)
The following mechanism then satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy (given , δ ∈
(0, 1)):
M(d) = Q(d) + ∆2Q

N (0, 2 ln (1.25/δ)) . (11)
 is additive formultiple queries [92] and therefore an -budget should be designed
to protect private data when queried multiple times. Practically, this means that
any differential privacy based system must keep track of who queries what and
how often to ensure that some predefined -budget is not surpassed. In a machine
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learning setting amethod of accounting for the accumulated privacy loss over training
iterations [10] needs to be employed to maintain an -budget.
Accumulated knowledge as described above is one of the weaknesses of differen-
tial privacy to keep sensitive data private [92]. Another is collusion. If multiple users
collude in the querying of the data (sharing the results of queries with one another)
the -budget for any single user might be breached. Finally, suppose an -budget is
assigned for each individual query; a user making queries on correlated data will
use only the budget for each query, yet may be able to gain more information due
to the fact that two quantities are correlated (e.g. income and rent). Clearly, large 
(or large -budgets) introduce greater risk of privacy breaches than small ones but
selecting an appropriate  is a non-trivial issue. Lee and Clinton [96] discuss the
means by which  might be selected for a given problem but identify that in order to
do so, the dataset and the queries on the dataset should be known ahead of time.
Noise addition can be applied in two separate scenarios. Given a trusted data
curator, noise can be added to queries on a static dataset, introducing only minimal
noise per query. This can be considered as a global privacy setting. Conversely in a
local privacy setting, no such trusted curator exits. Local differential privacy applies
when noise is added to each sample before collection/aggregation. For example, the
randomised response technique [97] allowparticipants to answer a question truthfully
or randomly based on the flip of a coin. Each participant therefore has plausible
deniability for their answer, yet statistics can still be estimated on the population
given enough data (and a fair coin flip). Each individual sample is extremely noisy in
the local case due to the high vulnerability of a single sample being leaked, however,
aggregated in volume, the noise can be filtered out to an extent to reveal population
statistics. Federated learning is another example of where local differential privacy
is useful [98]. Adding noise to the updates during training rounds on local user data
prior to aggregation by an untrusted parameter server provides greater privacy to the
user and their contributions to a global model (discussed further in section 5)
Limited examples of practical applications using differential privacy exist outside
of academia. Apple implemented differential privacy in its iOS 10 operating system
for the iPhone [99] in order collect statistics on emoji suggestions and safari crash
reports [100]. Google also collect usage statistics for the Chrome internet browser
using differential privacy via multiple rounds of the randomised response technique
coupled with a bloom filter to encode the domain names of sites a user has visited
[101]. Both these applications use local differential privacy to protect the individual’s
privacy but rely on large numbers of participating users in order to determine accurate
overall statistics.
Future research and applications of differential privacy are likely to focus on im-
proving utility whilst retaining good privacy guarantees in order for greater adoption
by the IT industry.
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5 Privacy preservation in federated learning
Federated learning already increases the level of privacy afforded to an individual
over traditional machine learning on a static dataset. It mitigates the storage of
sensitive personal data by a third party and prevents a third party from performing
learning tasks on the data for which the individual had not initially given permission.
Additionally, inference does not require that further sensitive data be sent to a third
party as the global model is available to the individual on their own private device
[11]. Despite these privacy improvements, the weight/gradient updates uploaded by
individuals may reveal information about the user’s data, especially if certain weights
in the weight matrix are sensitive to specific features or values in the individual’s
data (for example, specific words in a language prediction model [102]). These
updates are available to any client participating in federated learning as well as the
aggregating server.
Bonawitz et al. [103] show that devices participating in federated learning can
also act as parties involved in SMC to protect the privacy of all user’s updates.
In their “Secure Aggregation” protocol, the aggregating server only learns about
client updates in aggregate. Similarly, the ∝MDL protocol described in [105] uses
SMC but also encrypts the gradients on the client using homomorphic encryption.
The summation of the encrypted gradients over all participating clients gives an
encrypted global gradient, however this summation result can only be decrypted
once a threshold number of clients have shared their gradients. Therefore, again, the
server can only learn about client updates in aggregate, preserving the privacy of
individual contributions.
Researchers at Google have recently described the high-level design of a
production-ready federated learning framework [106] based on Tensorflow10. This
framework includes Secure Aggregation [103] as an option during training.
Applying SMC to federated learning suffers from increased communication and
greater computational complexity in the aggregation process (both for the client
and the server). Additionally, the fully trained model available to clients after the
federated learning procedure may still leak sensitive data about specific individuals
as described earlier. Adversarial attacks on federated learning models can be mit-
igated by inspecting and filtering out malicious client updates [41]. However, the
Secure Aggregation protocol [103] prevents the inspection of individual updates and
therefore cannot defend against such poisoning attacks [40] in this way.
While SMC achieves privacy through increased computational complexity, differ-
ential privacy trades off model utility for increased privacy. Additionally, differential
privacy protects individual’s contributions to the model during training and once the
model is fully trained. Differential privacy has been applied in multiple cases to mit-
igate the issue of publishing sensitive weight updates during communication rounds
in a federated learning setting. Shokri & Shmatikov [11] describe a communication-
efficient method for federated learning of a deep learningmodel tested on theMNIST
and SVHN datasets. They select only a fraction of the local gradient updates to share
10 https://www.tensorflow.org/
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Table 2 A summary of important contributions to federated learning research with a focus on
privacy enhancing mechanisms (DP = Differential privacy, HE = Homomorphic encryption, SMC
= Secure multi-party computation)
Ref Year Major contribution Privacy
mecha-
nism
Privacy details
[11] 2015 Description of a selective distibuted gradient
descent method to reduce communication and
the application of differential privacy to protect
the model parameter updates
DP Batch-level DP,  -DP
(Laplace mechanism)
[10] 2016 Description of an efficient accounting method
for accumulating privacy losses while training
a DNN with differential privacy
DP Batch-level DP, ( -δ)-DP
(Gaussian mechanism)
[103] 2017 Newmethod to provide securemulti-party com-
putation specifically tailored towards federated
learning
SMC Secure aggregation proto-
col evaluates the average
gradients of clients only
when a sufficient number
send updates
[98] 2017 Method for providing user-level differential pri-
vacy for federated learning with only small loss
in model utility
DP User-level DP, ( -δ)-DP
(Gaussian mechanism)
[102] 2017 Method for providing user-level differential pri-
vacy for federated learning without degrading
model utility
DP User-level DP, ( -δ)-DP
(Gaussian mechanism)
[104] 2017 Demonstration of an attack method on the
global model using a generative adversarial net-
work, effective even against record/batch-level
DP
DP Attack tested against
record/batch-level DP
(implemented using [11])
[105] 2017 Method for encrypting user updates during
distributed training, decryptable only when
many clients have participated in the distributed
learning objective
HE,
SMC
Gradient updates are en-
crypted using homomor-
phic encryption. Aggregate
server obtains average gra-
dient over all workers but
can only decrypt this result
once a certain number of up-
dates have been aggregated
[106] 2019 Description of a full-scale production-ready
federated learning system (focusing on mobile
devices)
SMC Optionally makes use of the
Secure aggregation proto-
col in [103]
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with a central server but also experiment with adding noise to the updates to satisfy
differential privacy and protect the contributions of individuals to the global model.
An -budget is divided and spent on selecting gradients above a certain threshold and
on publishing the gradients. Judging the sensitivity of SGD is achieved by bounding
the gradients between [−γ, γ] (γ is set to some small number). Laplacian noise is gen-
erated using this sensitivity and added to the updates prior to selection/publishing.
The authors show that their differentially private method outperforms standalone
training (training performed by each client on their own data alone) and approaches
the performance of SGD on a non-private static dataset given that enough clients
participate in each communication round.
Abadi et al. [10] apply a differentially private SGD mechanism to train on the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 image datasets. They show they can acheive 97% accuracy
on MNIST (1.3% worse than non-differentially private baseline) and 73% accuracy
on CIFAR-10 (7% worse than non-differentially private baseline) using a modest
neural network and principle component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the
input space. This is achieved using an ( , δ)-differential privacy of (8, 10−5). The
authors also introduce a privacy accountant to monitor the accumulated privacy loss
over all training operations based on moments of the privacy loss random variable.
The authors point out that the privacy loss is minimal for such a large number of
parameters and training examples.
Geyer et al. [98] make use of the moments privacy accountant from [10] and
evaluate the accumulated δ during training. Once the accumulated δ reaches a given
threshold, training is halted. Intuitively, training is halted once the risk of the privacy
guarantee being broken becomes too probable. This method of federated learning
protects the privacy of an individual’s participation in training over their entire local
dataset as opposed to a single data point during training as in [10]. The authors
show that with a sufficiently large number of clients participating in the federated
optimisation, only a minor drop in performance is recorded whilst maintaining a
good level of privacy over the individual’s data. Similarly, McMahan et al. [102]
apply user-level differential privacy (noise is added using sensitivity measured at the
user-level rather than sample ormini-batch level) via themoments privacy accountant
introduced in [10].
A method for attacking deep learning models trained via federated learning has
been proposed in [104]. This approach involves a malicious user participating in
federated training whose alternative objective is to train a generative adversarial
network (GAN) to generate realistic examples from the globally shared model during
training. The authors show that even a model trained with differentially private
updates is susceptible to the attack but that it could be defended against with user-
level or device-level differential privacy such as that which is described in [98] and
[102].
An alternative method to perform machine learning on private data is via a
knowledge distillation-like approach. Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles
(PATE) [107] trains a student model (which is published and used for inference)
using many teacher models in an ensemble. Neither the sensitive data available
to the teacher models, nor the teacher models themselves are ever published. The
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teacher models once trained on the sensitive data are then used to label public data
in a semi-supervised fashion via voting for the predicted class. The votes cast by
the teachers have noise generated via a Laplacian distribution added to preserve the
privacy of their predictions. This approach requires that public data is available to
train the student model, however shows better performance than [10] and [11] whilst
maintaining privacy guarantees (( , δ)-differential privacy of (2.04, 10−5) and (8.19,
10−6) on the MINST and SVHN datasets respectively). Further improvements to
PATE show that the method can scale to large multi-class problems [108].
6 Challenges in applying privacy-preserving federated learning
to the IoT
In this section, we identify and outline some promising areas to develop privacy-
preserving federated learning research, particularly focused on IoT environments.
6.1 Optimal model architecture/hyperparameters
Federated learning precludes seeing the data that a model is trained on. On a tra-
ditionally centralised dataset, a deep learning architecture and hyperparameters can
be selected via a validation strategy. However to follow the same approach in feder-
ated learning to find an optimal architecture or set the optimal hyperparameters to
produce good models would require training many models on user devices (possibly
incurring unacceptable amounts of battery power and bandwidth). Therefore novel
research is required to tackle this specific problem, unique to federated learning.
6.2 Continual learning
Training a machine learning model is an expensive and time-consuming task and
this can be significantly worse in the federated learning setting. As data distributions
evolve over time, a trained model’s performance deteriorates. To avoid the cost of
federated trainingmany times over, research intomethods for improving how amodel
learns is congruent to the federated learning objective over time. Methods such as
meta-learning, online learning and continual learning will be important here which
will have specific challenges unique to the distributed nature of federated learning.
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6.3 Better privacy preserving methods
As seen in this review, there is an observable tradeoff between the performance
of a model and the privacy that is afforded to a user. Further research is ongoing
into differential privacy accounting methods that introduce less noise into the model
(thus improving utility) for the same level of privacy (as judged by the  parameter).
Likewise, further research is required to vastly reduce the computational burden of
methods such as homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation in
order for them to become common-usemethods for preserving privacy for large-scale
machine learning tasks.
6.4 Federated learning combined with fog computing
Reducing the latency between rounds of training in federated learning is desirable to
trainmodels quickly. Fog computing nodes could feasibly be leveraged as aggregating
servers to remove the round-trip communication between clients and cloud servers
in the aggregation step of federated learning. Fog computing could also bring other
benefits, such as sharing the computational burden by hierarchically aggregating
many large client models.
6.5 Federated learning on low power devices
Training deep networks on resource constrained and low power devices poses spe-
cific challenges for federated learning. Much of the research into federated learning
focusses on mobile devices such as smartphones with abundant compute, storage
and power capabilities. As such, new methods are required for reducing the amount
of work individual devices need to do to contribute to training (perhaps using the
model parallelism approach seen in [13] or training only certain deep network layers
on subsets of devices.)
7 Conclusion
Deep learning has shown impressive successes in the fields of computer vision,
speech recognition and language modelling. With the exploding increase in deploy-
ments of IoT devices, naturally, deep learning is starting to be applied at the edge of
the network on mobile and resource-limited embedded devices. This environment
however presents difficult challenges for training deep models due to their energy,
compute and memory requirements. Beyond this, a model’s utility is strictly limited
to the data available to the edge device. Allowing machines close to the edge of the
A Review of Privacy-preserving Federated Learning for the Internet-of-Things 25
network to train on data produced by edge devices (as in fog computing) risks privacy
breaches of such data. Federated learning has been shown to be a good solution to
improve deep learning models while maintaining the privacy of the raw data.
Federated learning presents a new field of research but has great potential for
improving the privacy of training data and giving users control of how their data
is used by third parties. Combining federated learning with privacy mechanisms
such as differential privacy further secures user data from adversaries with the
inclination and means to reverse-engineer parameter updates in distributed SGD
procedures. Differential privacy as applied to machine learning is also in its infancy
and challenges remain to provide good privacy guarantees whilst simultaneously
limiting the required communication costs in a federated setting.
The intersection of federated learning, differential privacy and IoT data repre-
sents a fruitful area of research. Performing deep learning efficiently on resource-
constrained devices while preserving privacy and utility poses a real challenge.
Additionally, the nature of IoT data as opposed to internet data for private federated
learning deserves more attention from the research community. IoT data is often
represented by highly skewed non-IID data with high temporal variability. This is
a challenge that needs to be overcome for federated learning to flourish in edge
environments.
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